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Introduction
THIS VOLUME'S SYMPOSIUM EXPLORES the crucial conflict
American companies that store electronic communications face when
they mediate their customers' right to privacy and their government's
demands for information. On the one hand, customers should not be
subject to fishing expeditions through their stored electronic commu-
nications. On the other hand, government agents would like to access
those communications to pursue potential criminals and terrorists.
Electronic surveillance law requires government agents to justify, to
some degree, their need for the information they seek before a service
provider may be compelled to provide it to them. But what does "to
some degree" actually mean? What procedural hurdles must govern-
ment agents overcome, and what oversight will judges apply? Warshak
v. United States' raises these very questions because it asks the Sixth
Circuit to determine what showing a court should require of the Gov-
ernment, under the Stored Communications Act ("SCA"),2 before the
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1. Oral argument was held on April 18, 2007.
2. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 201, 100
Stat. 1848, 1860 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-09, 2711-12 (West 2000 &
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court orders a service provider to turn over its customer's stored elec-
tronic communications. The case also asks whether those statutory re-
quirements satisfy the Fourth Amendment.
The Warshak case poses the first constitutional challenge to the
SCA, which Congress passed in 1986 as part of the Electronic Commu-
nications Privacy Act ("ECPA"). 3 Steven Warshak, the plaintiff, seeks
to enjoin the Government from using a court order obtained under
18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) ("D order") to demand his stored e-mail messages
from his service providers. 4 Warshak maintains that agents violate the
Fourth Amendment when they use a D order to get stored e-mail,
because judges grant such orders without first finding probable
cause. 5 The Government admits to having used D orders to obtain
Warshak's e-mail and defends that practice on the ground that users
lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in their stored e-mails.6
We submitted an amicus brief to the Sixth Circuit on behalf of
fifteen professors of electronic privacy and internet law. 7 The Sixth
Circuit's decision in Warshak could significantly clarify the murky law
of electronic surveillance and could affirm that our electronic com-
munications receive meaningful protection under the Fourth Amend-
ment. As Kevin Bankston and Al Gidari describe in their contributions
to this volume, when the Government demands electronic communi-
cations from service providers, it does so behind the scenes, without
either notice to the targets or to the public.8 Warshak is the rare plain-
3. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848.
4. Warshak's complaint also requested a declaratory judgment that the SCA is un-
constitutional on its face and as applied. See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and In-
junctive Relief at 14, Warshakv. United States, No. 1:06-CV-357 (S.D. OhioJune 12, 2006).
Unless otherwise noted, the pleadings and briefs from the Warshak case are on file with the
authors.
5. Warshak also complained that the Government's practices violate the SCA as a
matter of statutory law. Id. at 11-14.
6. The nature of the stored e-mails sought is complex and we take it up later in this
introduction. See infra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
7. The Electronic Frontier Foundation also filed an amicus brief on behalf of itself,
the American Civil Liberties Union, the ACLU Foundation of Ohio, and the Center for
Democracy and Technology. See Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation et al.
Supporting Appellee and Urging Affirmance, Warshak v. United States, No. 06-4092 (6th
Cir. Nov. 22, 2006), available at http://www.eff.org/legal/cases/warshakvusa/warshak.
amicus.pdf.
8. We will discuss notice to the target infra text accompanying notes 23-24. As for
notice to the public, a court order issued under the SCA generally forbids the service
provider who receives it from disclosing that to anyone. See 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b) (2000); In
re Application of the United States of America for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703(d), Misc. No. 1105MJ00135 (S.D. Ohio May 6, 2005) (issuing an order to a service
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tiff who learned of the Government's surveillance and decided to
sue.9 His case asks the Sixth Circuit to provide the first decision on the
legality of government practices that have largely been immune from
suit.10 It also invites the court to establish what judicial oversight the
Fourth Amendment requires for government surveillance of stored e-
mail.11 That question, up until now, has had no clear answer. If the
Constitution in fact leaves us vulnerable to government fishing
through the vast array of personal information available in our stored
e-mails, then our use of modern communications technologies will re-
quire that we sacrifice essential privacy interests.
As part of a criminal investigation into Steven Warshak's opera-
tion of his company,12 government agents applied for D orders in May
and September of 2005. As requested, a magistrate judge in the South-
ern District of Ohio ordered two of Warshak's internet service provid-
ers ("ISPs") to turn over all of Warshak's stored e-mails and account
provider to reveal Warshak's communications including any e-mail communications that
had been accessed, viewed, or downloaded and precluding the service provider from dis-
closing to anyone, including Warshak, the existence of the order or. the investigation).
9. It seems that Warshak sought a temporary restraining order to stop the Govern-
ment from using D orders to obtain his stored e-mail during the pendency of its investiga-
tion against him. See Transcript of Proceedings (Telephone Conference) at 10-11,
Warshak v. United States, No. 1:06-CV-357 (S.D. Ohio July 5, 2006) ("[W]e're asking for a
restraining order against unconstitutional further conduct."); Plaintiff-Appellee Steven
Warshak's Opposition to United States' Motion to Stay Preliminary Injunction at 4-5, War-
shak v. United States, No. 06-4092 (6th Cir. filed Nov. 2, 2006) [hereinafter Warshak Stay
Opposition]; see also Susan N. Herman, The USA PATRIOT Act and the Submajoritarian Fourth
Amendment, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 67, 71, 103-04, 120-21 (2006) (discussing reasons
targets of stored e-mail surveillance do not sue).
10. In most cases, targets learn of searches, if at all, after those searches are complete,
at which point they may lack a strong incentive to sue. See, e.g., DanielJ. Solove, Reconstruct-
ing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1264, 1269 (2004); Susan Freiwald,
Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of the Wiretap Act, 56 ALA. L. REv. 9, 64 (2004)
[hereinafter Freiwald, Online Surveillance]. For example, were Warshak to succeed on a
claim that the Government's practices violated the SCA, he would be entitled to minimal
financial damages and he would not be afforded the benefit of a statutory exclusionary
rule. See, e.g., Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, STAN. TECH. L. REv.
(forthcoming 2007 Symposium) (manuscript at 3, on file with the authors) [hereinafter
Freiwald, First Principles]; Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw's Lens, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 1375, 1436 (2004); see also Orin S. Kerr, Lifting the "Fog" of Internet Surveil-
lance: How a Suppression Remedy Would Change Computer Law, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 807
(2003) (arguing that absence of a statutory suppression remedy has reduced judicial over-
sight of Governments' surveillance practices in the criminal context).
11. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee Steven Warshak, Warshak v. United States at 27,
30-32, No. 06-4092 (6th Cir. Nov. 13, 2006) [hereinafter Warshak Brief].
12. Warshak was subsequently indicted by a federal criminal jury on criminal counts
of bank and wire fraud, money laundering, and other federal crimes. See Brief for Defen-
dant-Appellant the United States of America at 8, Warshak v. United States, No. 06-4092
(6th Cir. Oct. 11, 2006) [hereinafter Government Brief].
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information, except those e-mails that had been neither accessed,
viewed, nor downloaded ("unaccessed e-mails").13 Both orders ex-
cluded unaccessed e-mails, because the Government lacked the proba-
ble cause warrant that it interpreted the SCA to require for
unaccessed e-mails.14 A strict word limit on our brief precluded us
from critiquing the Government's position that the SCA's warrant re-
quirement extends only to unaccessed e-mails, but numerous com-
mentators, including amici, have criticized it in their scholarship. 15 As
a practical matter, it seems unlikely that an e-mail account stored with
an ISP will contain many unaccessed e-mails, as users tend to
download or otherwise access their e-mails soon after receiving them.
In fact, the court orders encompassed an extensive amount of
information. 16 They granted access to "all customer account informa-
tion for any accounts registered or services rendered to" Warshak, in-
cluding the "contents of wire or electronic communications . . . that
were placed or entered in directories or files owned or controlled by
[Warshak's accounts] at any time during the hosting of the electronic
communications" (but excluding unaccessed e-mails). 1 7 In addition,
at least one of the orders required the ISP "to turn over all log files
and backup tapes; customer account identifiers; application informa-
tion; contact information; email addresses; billing information to in-
clude bank account numbers; and any other information pertaining
13. The Government also requested unopened e-mails stored more than 180 days,
based on its construction of the SCA. See also Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 135 F.
Supp. 2d 623, 636 (E.D. Pa. 2001), afJd in part on other grounds, 352 F.3d 107, 114 (3d Cir.
2004) (accepting Government's statutory construction). Yahoo!, one of the ISPs, did not
release any e-mails stored fewer than 180 days, apparently in response to a Ninth Circuit
precedent. See Warshak Brief, supra note 11, at 2 n.2 (citing Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359
F.3d 1066, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004) (rejecting Government's statutory interpretation), cert. de-
nied. 125 S. Ct. 48 (2004)); Warshak Stay Opposition, supra note 9, at 5 n.3 (citing Theofel,
359 F.3d 1066).
14. The Government also considers sent and draft e-mail to be available without a
probable cause warrant. See United States of America's Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiffs Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction at 2,
Warshak v. United States, No. 1:06-CV-357 (S.D. Ohio filed July 5, 2006) ("Unopened e-
mail stored on a service provider's servers fall within the scope of 'electronic storage,' but
opened e-mail, draft e-mail, and copies of sent e-mail do not.").
15. See Freiwald, Online Surveillance, supra note 10, at 56-57.
16. The judge who reviewed them interpreted one of the orders as requesting infor-
mation "'about accounts registered or services rendered to' Warshak or 'associated par-
ties.'" Warshak v. United States, No. 1:06-CV-357, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50076, at *3 (S.D.
Ohio July 21, 2006). Warshak's mother intervened as a plaintiff because she claimed that
the ISPs had disclosed her e-mail accounts as well. Id. at *32 n.19; United States v. Contents
of Nationwide Life Insurance Account in the Name of Warshak, No. C-1-05-196, 2006 WL
971978 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 12, 2006).
17. Warshak, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50076, at *3-*4.
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to the customer, including setup, synchronization, etc."18 According
to Warshak, the Government seized thousands of e-mails, of a "deeply
personal nature, of no conceivable relevance to the government's
investigation."19
The magistrate judge who granted the orders found that the Gov-
ernment satisfied the legal requirements for a D order because the
Government had "offered specific and articulable facts showing that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the records or other in-
formation sought are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
investigation. " 20 By contrast, to obtain a warrant, government agents
must show probable cause to believe that their search of the records
will yield evidence of a crime.2 '
A few weeks after the Government notified Warshak of the ISP
court orders in May of 2006, Warshak sued to enjoin the Government
from acquiring his e-mails without first obtaining a probable cause
warrant. Warshak argued that the Fourth Amendment generally re-
quires warrants for access to letters and sealed packages, which War-
shak claimed were analogous to his stored e-mails. The Government
pressed the court to analogize stored e-mails to post-cards, searches of
which do not implicate the Fourth Amendment. Judge Dlott, who
heard the case, preferred the letter analogy for stored e-mails and de-
cided that Warshak had shown a substantial likelihood of success on
his Fourth Amendment claim. 22 At least for purposes of the prelimi-
nary injunction, the court rejected the Government's claim that War-
shak surrendered his reasonable expectation of privacy in his e-mails
by storing them in subscriber accounts with his ISPs.
18. Id. at *3 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also In re Application of the
United States of America for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), Misc. No.
1105MJ00135 (S.D. Ohio May 6, 2005).
19. Warshak Stay Opposition, supra note 9, at 2, 4 n.I. Warshak expresses concern not
only about Government access to his own communications, but about the disclosure of the
private communications of those with whom he communicated. See Memorandum in Sup-
port of Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction at 18,
Warshak v. United States, No. 1:06-CV-357 (S.D. Ohio filed June 30, 2006).
20. See In re Application of the United States of America for an Order Pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 2703(d), Misc. No. 1105MJ00135 (S.D. Ohio May 6, 2005); 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)
(2000).
21. See FED. R. Civ. P. 41(c)(1).
22. Judge Dlott declined to address the statutory argument as well. See Warshak, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50076, at *20 ("Because Warshak has demonstrated a sufficient likelihood
of success on his Fourth Amendment claim to support an injunction . . . , the Court need
not reach, for purposes of the present Motion, the merits of Warshak's secondary claim
that the 2703(d) orders obtained and/or threatened by the United States in this matter
violate the SCA."). Similarly, our amicus brief concentrated on the constitutional question.
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Judge Dlott's opinion expressed significant concern about the
Government's practice of obtaining D orders and then delaying notifi-
cation to the targets of those orders. The SCA requires that targets be
notified before law enforcement agents use a D order to obtain the
contents of communications, but permits agents to request that such
notice be delayed for ninety-day increments, when prior notice would
seriously jeopardize the investigation. 23 The D orders that the Govern-
ment used in the Warshak case permitted notice to be delayed for
ninety days, yet Warshak was not informed of the searches for more
than a year. Judge Dlott found that the Government had not obtained
any extension of the original ninety-day period. 24
Judge Dlott's order reflected her "grave constitutional concerns"
about the Government's practices. 25 She decided, provisionally, that
the "combination of a standard of proof less than probable cause and
potentially broad ex parte authorization cannot stand."26 While unpre-
pared to declare as facially invalid any SCA provisions that authorize
use of D orders to obtain stored e-mail, Judge Dlott preliminarily en-
joined the United States from using D orders to seize "the contents of
any personal email account maintained by an internet service pro-
vider in the name of any resident of the Southern District of Ohio,
including but not limited to Steve Warshak, without providing the rel-
evant account holder or subscriber prior notice and an opportunity to
be heard."27
The Government devotes a substantial amount of its brief to argu-
ing that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case be-
cause Warshak had not established a sufficient risk that the
Government would continue to pursue his e-mails. 28 Warshak coun-
ters that the Government's failure to commit to not using future D
orders to obtain his stored e-mail, combined with the fact that they
did so in the past without notifying him for long periods, permitted
23. See 18 U.S.C. § 2705 (2000) (describing the following adverse results: "(A) endan-
gering the life or physical safety of an individual; (B) flight from prosecution; (C) destruc-
tion of or tampering with evidence; (D) intimidation of potential witnesses; or (E)
otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or unduly delaying a trial").
24. See Warshak, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50076, at *30 n.18.
25. Id. at 26-28.
26. Id. at 31.
27. Id. at 32.
28. See Government Brief, supra note 12, at 18-29. The Government contends that
Warshak lacks standing and that his claims are not ripe for review. Id.
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him to petition for protection of his constitutional rights.2 9 If the
Sixth Circuit fails to reach the merits of Warshak's case, that will pre-
serve the status quo, under which it is uncertain how, if at all, the
Fourth Amendment protects stored e-mails. We do know, however,
that the Government views stored e-mails as subject to search on mini-
mal process and that agents will surely continue their current prac-
tices until another lawsuit arises or Congress intervenes.
In defending the constitutionality of its practices, the Govern-
ment claims that the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement does
not apply because Warshak had no reasonable expectation of privacy
in his stored e-mails. According to the Government, because Warshak
agreed, either implicitly or explicitly, to permit his service providers to
monitor his accounts, he cannot claim a reasonable expectation of
privacy in those accounts. We argue in our brief that, although service
providers may monitor their users' accounts to maintain their service,
such monitoring does not constitute a waiver of their users' constitu-
tional claims vis-;I-vis the Government. Moreover, we contend that ser-
vice providers are state actors when they give over the contents of
their users' e-mail accounts in response to mandatory process, not-
withstanding whatever private right they had to monitor.30 We find
significant support for our position in a recent case issued by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.3' But so far no
Article III court has weighed in on the question.
The Government also defends a right to compel a third party to
disclose information it holds subject only to a constitutional reasona-
bleness requirement, notwithstanding the user's reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy. It posits a "simple rule," under which "'the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed
to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities.' 32
The Government bases its "third party rule" on a broad reading of
decades old Supreme Court precedents. 33 In our brief, we argue that
the Government misreads those precedents, which should not be con-
29. See Warshak Brief, supra note 11, at 11-26. Warshak's papers indicate that he was
not notified of the prior orders until he requested notification himself, having apparently
learned of the orders another way. Id. at 1.
30. Warshak makes a similar argument in his appellate brief. See id. at 41-43.
31. See United States v. Long, 64 M.J. 57 (C.A.A.F. 2006).
32. See Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellant United States of America at 17, Warshak
v. United States, No. 06-4092 (6th Cir. Jan. 11, 2007) (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
735, 744 (1979)).
33. See id. (drawing the rule from both Smith and United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435,
443 (1976)).
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strued to permit compelled disclosure upon mere reasonableness in
those cases in which the target retains a reasonable expectation of
privacy. The Government's purported third party rule has come
under substantial criticism from law professors, including several
amici. 34 But the Government finds limited support for its claim in
some judicial opinions that have curtailed privacy protection of elec-
tronic information (though not the content of stored e-mails) on simi-
lar reasoning.35 The Sixth Circuit, in Warshak, has the opportunity to
delineate the scope of the third party rule, and, we hope, to limit its
application. If the Government's broad third party rule stands, it pre-
cludes any meaningful constitutional protection for internet-based in-
formation, which almost always resides with third partiesY3
In defending the merits of Judge Dlott's order, Warshak attacks
the Government's claims that mere reasonableness suffices as a consti-
tutional matter in this context. He also demonstrates at length how
administrative subpoenas, which the Government claims to be analo-
gous to D orders, offer protections to the target that D orders do not
and why, therefore, D orders should be analyzed differently.3 7 War-
shak presses the Sixth Circuit to recognize that the constitutional
question must precede the statutory one. If the Fourth Amendment
does not tolerate the warrantless procedures by which the Govern-
ment currently obtains stored e-mails, as Warshak claims, then that
trumps whatever Congress may have intended when it drafted the
SCA. If the Sixth Circuit agrees that the Fourth Amendment requires
the Government to obtain a probable cause warrant prior to compel-
ling production of stored e-mails, then the court will endeavor to in-
terpret the SCA consistently with that requirement. Any SCA
provisions that may not be read to conform to the Fourth Amend-
ment will have to be overturned.
34. See, e.g., Bellia, supra note 10, at 1397-1412; Deirdre K. Mulligan, ReasonableExpec-
tations in Electronic Communications: A Critical Perspective on the Electronic Communications Pri-
vacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1557, 1576-82 (2004); Peter P. Swire, Katz is Dead. Long
Live Katz, 102 MICH. L. REv. 904, 923-33 (2004).
35. See, e.g., Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 335-36 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Ham-
brick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 508 (W.D. Va. 1999), affd, 225 F.3d 656 (4th Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 1099 (2001); United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1110 (D. Kan.
2000).
36. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 GEo. L.J. 357,
367-68 (2003) (discussing role of third-party service providers in transmitting and storing
e-mail and observing that, under one perspective of how the Fourth Amendment applies to
the Internet, law enforcement officials can compel service providers to disclose e-mails with
a mere subpoena).
37. Our amicus brief addresses the Government's claimed "compelled disclosure"
rule at some length as well.
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Because our amicus brief could not exceed 8000 words, we had to
severely limit the topics that that we covered and the treatment of
those that we did cover. Besides refraining from a critique of the Gov-
ernment's statutory construction, we also significantly condensed our
refutation of the Government's third party rule. 38 In addition, we cut
short an argument for imposing the higher procedural hurdles of the
Wiretap Act to government surveillance of stored e-mails. 39 If those
procedural hurdles had applied, as they do to real-time interceptions,
then government investigators would have needed to establish a
tighter nexus between the surveillance sought and Warshak's criminal
liability. They would also have needed to establish that their search
was necessary as a last resort and would proceed only for a limited
time. In addition, government investigators would have had to submit
to greater judicial oversight, for example to ensure that they mini-
mized the acquisition of non-incriminating information. Importantly,
they would have needed to notify each target as soon as they com-
pleted their search. 40
As Al Gidari describes in his article in this volume, service provid-
ers currently respond to a huge number of inquiries for stored com-
munications data.4 1 The procedures imposed on government agents
before they may obtain such data determine whether a member of the
judiciary provides meaningful oversight to ensure respect for Fourth
Amendment values. The more government monitors avoid judicial
scrutiny of their practices, the more citizens must depend on the De-
partment of Justice to conform its behavior to those legal standards
that it sets for itself. As Kevin Bankston discusses, government investi-
gators do not seem to be choosing the right standards, and of course,
there is no way, without judicial oversight, to ensure that they even
abide by those standards. 42 The Sixth Circuit may alter this concentra-
38. For further critique of the Government's third-party rule, see sources cited supra
note 34.
39. For more information on the subject, see Freiwald, First Principles, supra note 10.
40. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2000); Freiwald, Online Surveillance, supra note 10, at 25.
41. See A. Gidari, Companies Caught in the Middle, 41 U.S.F. L. REv. 535, 553 (manu.
17-18) (2007); cf OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL: A REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION'S USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY LETrERS xviii (2007) (finding that, from 2003
through 2005, the FBI issued at least 143,000 requests for records of telephone use, elec-
tronic mail, financial information, and credit data under statutes permitting access to such
records in national security investigations) [hereinafter OIG REPORT]. See generally Her-
man, supra note 9 (discussing the provisions that regulate National Security Letters).
42. See Kevin S. Bankston, Only the DOJ Knows: The Secret Law of Electronic Surveillance, 41
U.S.F. L. REv. 587 (2007); see also OIG REPORT, supra note 41, at xxviii-xli, 66-107 (docu-
menting pervasive failures by FBI agents to satisfy statutory requirements and several differ-
ent means by which agents acquired information from service providers improperly).
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tion of surveillance power in the executive branch by proclaiming that
the Fourth Amendment provides significant protection for stored e-
mail. Our amicus brief urges it to do so.
Interest of Amici 43
Amici are scholars who teach, write about, or have an interest in
electronic privacy law and internet law. Amici have no stake in the
outcome of this case, but are interested in ensuring that electronic
privacy law develops with due regard for the vital role electronic com-
munications play in our lives. A full list of amici is appended to the
signature page. Both defendant-appellant and plaintiff-appellee have
consented to the filing of this brief.
Summary of Argument
Electronic mail ("e-mail") has become an essential medium of
communication and assumed a vital role in our lives. The contents of
our e-mail accounts reveal extensive and detailed information about
our interests, our views, and our actions. Yet, the Government in this
case claims the right to obtain the entirety of our personal e-mail ac-
counts from our service providers, without first establishing probable
cause or providing us notice, so long as we have previously accessed
our e-mails in some way. Acceptance of this radical claim would dra-
matically limit judicial oversight of an immensely powerful surveil-
lance tool and eviscerate the privacy of electronic communications.
Though the Government presents the question as well settled, no
federal courts have addressed government acquisition of e-mail from a
service provider without prior notice ("stored e-mail surveillance"), al-
though two military courts have found that it requires a probable
cause warrant. 44 More fundamentally, when the Government argues
that a constitutional "reasonableness" standard applies to stored e-
mail surveillance because the applicable statute apparently approves
of subpoena-like authority, it begs the essential question: does stored
e-mail surveillance by the Government on less than probable cause
satisfy the Fourth Amendment? Amici, law professors who write and
teach in the areas of electronic privacy law and internet law, believe
that it does not.
43. From this point forward, the text of this Article has been adapted from the
authors' amicus brief, with only minor revisions.
44. Amici do not address what procedural requirements apply when the Government
does give the target prior notice.
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Because it invades a reasonable expectation of privacy, stored e-
mail surveillance constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment,
and may not be conducted without first obtaining a warrant based on
probable cause. "Compelling" a service provider to produce a per-
son's e-mail does not entitle government agents to evade that constitu-
tional requirement.
Argument
I. Stored E-mail Surveillance Is a Search Under the Fourth
Amendment that Requires, at a Minimum, a Warrant
Based on Probable Cause
Courts, and not Congress, must determine the threshold issue:
how does the Constitution regulate stored e-mail surveillance? Be-
cause government agents intrude upon users' reasonable expectation
of privacy when they acquire private e-mails, they conduct a search
under the Fourth Amendment.45 That expectation of privacy obtains
whether the e-mails acquired are stored or in transit, and whether or
not their recipients have accessed them. Nothing in the private con-
tracts between users and their internet service providers affects the
application of those constitutional protections.
A. Users Maintain a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Their E-
mails, Whether or Not Those E-mails Have Been Stored
or Accessed
Users maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in their e-
mail, whether that e-mail is in transit or has come to rest.46 The rea-
sonable expectation of privacy test, which is used to determine
whether a particular investigatory technique constitutes a search
under the Fourth Amendment, asks whether a target of an investiga-
tion entertains an actual expectation of privacy in the object of the
search (subjective prong), and whether that expectation of privacy is
one that society deems reasonable (objective prong).47
45. The First Amendment also supports imposing significant burdens on law enforce-
ment access to e-mails, because they are communications. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557, 564 (1969) ("It is now well established that the Constitution protects the right to
receive information and ideas."); see also Daniel Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal
Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2007).
46. United States v. Long, 64 M.J. 57, 65 (C.A.A.F. 2006); United States v. Maxwell, 45
MJ. 406, 418 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
47. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32-33 (2001); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
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1. Warshak Had a Subjective Expectation of Privacy in the E-mails
Stored with His Service Providers
Warshak's use of his e-mail demonstrates his subjective expecta-
tion of privacy in it.48 The subjective prong precludes affording consti-
tutional protection to those who themselves did not view the object of
the investigation as private. To require that government agents refrain
from viewing information easily seen by others is unfair and unneces-
sary. It is unfair because the Government should not be disadvantaged
vis-d-vis the average member of the public. It is unnecessary because
we assume that before people make information available to all they
have either determined the repercussions to be harmless, or assumed
the risk of those repercussions. The Constitution does not protect in-
formation that one has "knowingly expose[d] to the public."49
In this case, there is no evidence that Warshak knowingly exposed
the entirety of his e-mail accounts to the public. Instead, Warshak
used the e-mail accounts the Government seized to send e-mails "of a
deeply personal nature."50 As we discuss in Part I.B below, that War-
shak maintained e-mail accounts with service providers did not vitiate
his subjective expectation of privacy.
2. Warshak's Expectation of Privacy in His E-mails Was Objectively
Reasonable
E-mail has become so indispensable that it must be reasonable for
us to expect that it is private. One who looks at our e-mails obtains a
detailed view into our innermost thoughts; no previous mode of sur-
veillance exposes more. When we compose private and professional e-
mails, embed links to internet sites in some, and attach documents,
pictures, sound files, and videos to others, we rely on the privacy of
the medium. Society does not make us rely at our peril but rather
accepts as reasonable our expectations of privacy in e-mail.
The public reasonably expects e-mail to be private, despite the
fact that e-mail may be vulnerable to surveillance. The Supreme Court
found the expectation of privacy in telephone calls to be reasonable
in Katz, despite public awareness of the vulnerability of those calls to
interception. In the years preceding Katz, the public had learned of
rampant illegal wiretapping from numerous influential books, schol-
48. See Warshak Stay Opposition, supra note 9, at 11 n.6.
49. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
50. See Warshak Stay Opposition, supra note 9, at 4 n.1.
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arly articles, and newspaper accounts. 51 In the same period, Congress
considered new legislation and convened numerous hearings and
commissioned lengthy expert reports that detailed communications'
vulnerability. 52 The Katz Court nonetheless found warrantless wiretap-
ping to be unconstitutional, despite the lack of absolute privacy in
telephone calls.53 Similarly, a government pronouncement that e-
mails are vulnerable may not defeat our reasonable expectations of
privacy in it.54 Otherwise, the Constitution would be powerless to pre-
vent executive branch overreaching.
In Katz, the Supreme Court based constitutional protection of
telephone calls on the overriding importance of the telephone sys-
tem. 55 In other words, whatever people actually thought or knew
about the privacy of their telephone calls, they were entitled to believe in
the privacy of telephone calls, because any other result would be de-
structive of society's ability to communicate. 56
Because e-mails typically contain much richer data than tele-
phone calls, e-mail surveillance intrudes much more on personal pri-
vacy than does an analogous wiretap. Although many modern e-mails
incorporate other media, even a simple text e-mail can reveal a
lengthy back-and-forth exchange between the parties to the corre-
spondence. People reveal in their e-mails much more about their po-
litical opinions, religious beliefs, personal relationships, intellectual
interests, and artistic endeavors than they ever revealed over the tele-
phone. Stored e-mails, in particular, contain a vast archive of people's
past activities.
Society now relies on e-mail and its powerful features much more
than it relied on the telephone system at the time of Katz. Because of
e-mail's vital role in modern communications, users have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in it, and agents must secure at least a probable-
cause warrant under the Fourth Amendment before they obtain it.5 7
51. See Freiwald, Online Surveillance, supra note 10, at 38-39.
52. Id. at 74-75.
53. See id. at 38 & n.203.
54. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979) (recognizing that the expecta-
tion of privacy analysis must be replaced by a normative analysis when "subjective expecta-
tions had been 'conditioned' by influences alien to well-recognized Fourth Amendment
freedoms").
55. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 ("To read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the
vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private communication.").
56. Id. (holding that one who places a telephone "call is surely entitled to assume that
the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world").
57. Several Courts of Appeals imposed the heightened procedural requirements for
wiretapping on silent video surveillance because it was just as intrusive, continuous, hid-
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3. Warshak Had a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in His E-
mails After His Service Provider Stored Them and He
Accessed Them
Stored e-mail should not receive less constitutional protection
than e-mail in transit.58 More extensive e-mail correspondence may be
found on a third party's server than may be intercepted. When a gov-
ernment agent intercepts e-mails in transit, she acquires only the e-
mail traveling at that moment. The agent must continue the surveil-
lance for so long as she hopes to track the target's correspondence.
To obtain e-mails covering a vast length of time, it would be far sim-
pler and easier to conduct stored e-mail surveillance afterwards in a
single shot. For example, rather than running an e-mail wiretap for
three months from January 1 to March 31, an agent may obtain the
same electronic communications from the service provider by de-
manding, on March 31, prior e-mails going back three months. That
the Government apparently obtained thousands of e-mails, both sent
and received, from Warshak's service providers, from accounts over
nine years old, starkly illustrates the power and scope of stored e.mail
surveillance. 59
By the same token, a user should enjoy full Fourth Amendment
protection for e-mail messages that she has accessed. 60 Nothing in the
reading of an e-mail (let alone its being opened) makes the corre-
spondence less private or its acquisition less intrusive. Users leave cop-
ies of their already-read e-mails in their accounts for many reasons,
and almost never out of a lack of concern for the privacy of those e-
mails. In fact, most users delete their least important, least sensitive e-
mails, and retain the others for later use. Users store private e-mails in
their accounts because they do not know how to do otherwise, or be-
cause they are not aware that their service providers maintain cop-
den, and indiscriminate. See, e.g., United States v. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536, 542 (9th Cir.
1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1005 (1992) (imposing the following constitutional
requirements in addition to probable cause: particular description, last resort, limited
time, and minimization). Because e-mail surveillance threatens privacy and risks abuse as
much as wiretapping, it too should be subject to the heightened requirements. See
Freiwald, Online Surveillance, supra note 10, at 14.
58. See United States v. Long, 64 MJ. 57 (C.AA.F. 2006); United States v. Maxwell, 45
MJ. 406 (C.A.A.F. 1996); supra note 46 and accompanying text.
59. See Warshak Stay Opposition, supra note 9, at 2, 11.
60. Amici use the term "accessed" to cover accessed, opened, viewed, and downloaded
e-mail. The Government claims the right to acquire accessed e-mails, draft e-mails, and
sent e-mails without a probable cause warrant.
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ies.61 Many users simply neglect to delete e-mails until they run out of
storage space; that retention does not indicate that users have know-
ingly exposed those e-mails to public or law enforcement view. The
Government's strained statutory argument should not confuse the fact
that a user's access to his e-mail does not affect its constitutional
protection.
Before obtaining disclosure of the contents of an e-mail account
stored on a service provider's computer, the Fourth Amendment re-
quires that government agents obtain, at a minimum, a probable
cause warrant, or that they invoke a proper exception to the warrant
requirement. "The historical judgment, which the Fourth Amend-
ment accepts, is that unreviewed executive discretion may yield too
readily to pressures to obtain incriminating evidence and overlook po-
tential invasions of privacy and protected speech."62 That stored e-
mail surveillance takes place entirely outside of the reach and knowl-
edge of the target makes it particularly prone to abuse. The warrant
requirement protects e-mails whether in transit or stored, and
whether accessed or not.63
B. E-mail Users Do Not Forfeit an Expectation of Privacy in Their
Communications Merely by Storing Those Communications
with a Service Provider, Even Where the Service Provider
Retains a Right of Access
The Government's argument that an e-mail user forfeits any ex-
pectation of privacy and exposes her e-mail to indiscriminate govern-
ment surveillance when she relies on a service provider to transmit
and store that e-mail ignores a range of cases in which courts have
recognized an expectation of privacy in items held by a third party.
Moreover, it misunderstands the significance to this dispute of the
Stored Communications Act 64 and of service providers' policies and
practices regarding access to the communications they store.
61. Service providers may retain e-mails as a matter of practice or government com-
pulsion. See 18 U.S.C. § 2704 (2000) (compelling backup preservation of electronic
communications).
62. United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972).
63. As discussed, a probable cause warrant alone may be constitutionally insufficient.
See supra note 57.
64. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 201, 100
Stat. 1848, 1860 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-09, 2711-12 (West 2000 &
Supp. 2007)).
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1. Allowing a Third Party to Carry or Store an Item Does Not
Eliminate Any Expectation of Privacy in That Item65
Placing something in the care of a third party does not, without
more, make the Government free to acquire it without a warrant. The
Government's argument to the contrary appears to stem from a broad
reading of the Supreme Court's "business records" cases.66 The post-
Katz v. United States foundation for this line of cases is United States v.
Miller,67 where the Supreme Court held that a bank customer had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in financial records held by his
banks, because "[a] depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to
another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the
Government."68
Miller and its progeny do not support the Government's position
that communications placed in the hands of a third party are subject
to compelled disclosure merely because a third party holds them.
Miller relied on two lines of cases to arrive at the assumption-of-risk
language quoted above. First, Miller relied on pre-Katz cases evaluating
the compelled disclosure of business records under a reasonableness
standard. The Court confirmed the post-Katz vitality of the reasonable-
ness analysis by concluding that financial records that form part of a
business relationship with the bank are not the kind of items in which
one can expect privacy. 69 Second, Miller drew upon a series of cases
involving communications revealed, recorded, or transmitted to the
Government by an informant or undercover agent who is a party to
the communication. 70 In those cases, the Court had reasoned that "no
interest legitimately protected by the Fourth Amendment is involved,"
because the Fourth Amendment does not protect "a wrongdoer's mis-
65. Portions of this discussion are drawn from Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law
Through Cyberlaw's Lens, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1375, 1397-1413 (2004).
66. See Government Brief, supra note 12, at 36-40, 43-45.
67. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). In a prior case, Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973),
the Court addressed a Fourth Amendment challenge to an IRS summons compelling an
accountant to surrender records used in preparing the defendant's tax return. The Court
gave the Fourth Amendment claim only brief treatment because it "[did] not appear to be
independent of [the taxpayer's] Fifth Amendment argument." Id. at 325-26 n.6. The
Court's reasoning was similar to that which it later employed in Miller. See id. at 336 n.19.
68. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443; see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (holding
that user has no expectation of privacy in telephone numbers revealed to the telephone
company to connect calls).
69. See Miller, 425 U.S. at 440-42.
70. Id. at 443.
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placed belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrong-
doing will not reveal it."71
Neither of the two lines of cases on which Miller relies points to-
ward the Government's categorical rule that one loses one's expecta-
tion of privacy by allowing a provider to transmit or store
communications. Communications are not business records of the
sort contemplated in Miller and its progeny. And to place a communi-
cation in the hands of a third party for carriage or storage is not to
"confide" or "reveal" that communication in the same sense that one
"confides" or "reveals" something to a government informant or agent
by speaking to that person, or in the sense that a depositor "reveals"
something to a bank so that the bank can process a transaction, or in
the sense that one "reveals" a telephone number so that the telephone
company can connect a call. Indeed, any categorical rule that a pro-
vider's involvement eliminates a user's reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy runs headlong into the Court's holding in Katz v. United States.
Katz, after all, involved communications carried over a telephone line
by a communications carrier that undoubtedly had the technical abil-
ity to monitor the communications. 72 If the Government's reasoning
in this case were correct, Miller would have overruled Katz sub silentio,
even while the Miller Court purported to affirm and apply Katz.
Moreover, in a range of contexts, courts have recognized that a
third-party's involvement in carrying or storing property does not
leave government agents free to inspect that property. When the
United States Postal Service carries mail or a sealed package, for ex-
ample, government agents cannot open the items without obtaining a
warrant. As the Supreme Court has recognized, "[1]etters and other
sealed packages are in the general class of effects in which the public
at large has a legitimate expectation of privacy; warrantless searches of
such effects are presumptively unreasonable. '73
Similarly, when someone maintains personal property on a third
party's premises, she retains an expectation of privacy in it, so long as
71. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); see also United States v. White,
401 U.S. 745, 749, 751 (1971) (plurality opinion); Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323,
331 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
72. 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
73. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984); see also Ex parte Jackson, 96
U.S. 727, 733 (1877) ("Letters and sealed packages.., are as fully guarded from examina-
tion and inspection.., as if they were retained by the parties forwarding them in their own
domiciles.").
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the property is secured against others' access and the third party's
right of access to the premises is limited.7 4
This case is analogous to cases involving a third party's carriage or
storage of physical property. Agents here sought to remove e-mail
communications from a storage area set aside exclusively for the use
of the subscriber and to which nobody but the provider had physical
access. Yet the Government does not cite or discuss these cases. In-
stead, it seeks a categorical rule that third-party involvement extin-
guishes an expectation of privacy.
2. Service Provider Assistance to Government Agents Does Not
Reduce the Government's Constitutional Obligations
The Government builds much of its case on the fact that its
agents obtained Warshak's stored e-mail from his service providers.
But the Government may not avoid its constitutional obligations by
engaging an intermediary in its surveillance. The Government also ar-
gues that service providers' technical ability to access and scan com-
munications for harmful content and attachments, or terms of service
announcing that they may do so, can eliminate users' expectation of
privacy in communications stored with such providers. 75 Crediting
that claim would misconstrue the applicable statute, the nature of a
service provider's right to protect its own property, and the nature of
the contractual relationship between users and their service providers.
74. See, e.g., Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964) (search of hotel room with-
out warrant violated Fourth Amendment, even though one who engages a hotel room gives
implied permission to hotel personnel to enter to perform their duties); Chapman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 610, 616-18 (1961) (search of house occupied by tenant violated
Fourth Amendment, even though landlord had authority to enter house for some pur-
poses); United States v. Johns, 851 F.2d 1131, 1133-35 (9th Cir. 1988) (implicitly recogniz-
ing reasonable expectation of privacy in rented storage unit); cf United States v. Rahme,
813 F.2d 31, 34 (2d Cir. 1987) (where hotel guest failed to pay rent and rental period
expired, hotel could lawfully take possession of items in room and guest had no reasonable
expectation of privacy); United States v. Poulsen, 41 F.3d 1330, 1336 (9th Cir. 1994)
(renter of storage unit loses expectation of privacy when he fails to pay rent, and facility
manager may seize property and turn it over to law enforcement).
75. Government Brief, supra note 12, at 49.
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a. The Involvement of a Service Provider in the Government's
Stored E-mail Surveillance Does Not Impact the
Government's Constitutional Obligations
A service provider acts as the Government's agent when it accedes
to surveillance requests. 76 When the Government initiates the search
of the target's e-mail account, as it did in this case, the service pro-
vider's actions to facilitate the search do not convert the Govern-
ment's surveillance from state action subject to Fourth Amendment
requirements to a private search. 77 In addition, when electronic com-
munications providers furnish stored e-mail to government investiga-
tors, that parallels the common practice of telecommunications
companies providing telephone line access to government wiretap-
pers. Wiretapping assistance is not only statutorily mandated, 78 it has
never reduced the Government's constitutional obligations. 79 Service
provider involvement in stored e-mail surveillance does not reduce
the constitutional regulation of that practice either.
b. Terms of Service Providing that the Government May Be
Granted Access Do Not Affect the Constitutional
Requirements for Stored E-mail Surveillance
The Government argues that most service providers have policies
stating that they will disclose communications in response to legal pro-
cess, and that this fact eliminates any expectation of privacy in e-mail
communications. 80 A service provider's policy of complying with legal
process, however, cannot defeat a user's reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy. E-mail users must be entitled to presume that agents will present
appropriate legal process, not that they will present any legal process. It
would turn the law on its head if service providers could merely notify
their users that they intend to comply with unconstitutional govern-
76. See United States v. Long, 64 MJ. 57, 65 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (describing seizure of
stored e-mail by network administrator as "a part of a search for law enforcement
purposes").
77. See United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 422 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (service provider's
search of stored e-mail at the Government's request not a "private search"); see also McClel-
land v. McGrath, 31 F. Supp. 2d 616, 619 (N.D. 11. 1998) (noting that when telephone
company employees act "at the request or direction of police officers," they act as govern-
ment agents and the Fourth Amendment applies).
78. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (2000) (requiring and regulating provider assistance).
79. Service provider assistance in government surveillance does impose statutory obli-
gations on the service provider in addition to any constitutional ones. See 18 U.S.C. § 2707
(2000 & Supp. IV 2004) (permitting civil suits against service providers for improper
disclosure).
80. See Government Brief, supra note 12, at 34-35.
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ment demands and thereby immunize the Government from constitu-
tional claims.
c. The Fact that Service Providers Can and Do Screen E-mail
Under Certain Circumstances Does Not Eliminate a
User's Expectation of Privacy Vis-ii-vis
Government Agents
The Government errs when it claims that Congress, through
adoption of the Stored Communications Act ("SCA"), granted service
providers an unfettered right to access users' e-mail and thereby extin-
guished any expectation of privacy. Congress simply cannot extin-
guish a constitutional right by statute. Moreover, the SCA grants no
such unfettered right of access. It is true that a service provider is not
subject to federal criminal prosecution and civil liability under the SCA for
unauthorized access of its subscribers' communications. Contrary to
the Government's suggestion, however, immunity from criminal or
civil liability under one particular federal statute is not the same thing
as an unfettered right of access, for it says nothing about other sources
of law (including other federal statutes, contractual provisions, state
statutes, or common law protections) that might limit a service pro-
vider's access to a user's communications. 81
If communications providers retain broad rights of access to user
e-mails in their own terms of service, those provisions do not concern
the relationship between the user and the Government. Terms of ser-
vice set forth the ways in which a service provider may need to protect
its system and business from fraud, hacking, unauthorized use, and
the like. Whatever rights the service provider might have to access
communications to perform those functions, those rights do not give
the service provider the right to disclose communications for the fun-
damentally different purpose of assisting law enforcement investiga-
tions of unrelated crimes.82
81. See United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 82 (lst Cir. 2005) (en banc) (declin-
ing to dismiss federal Wiretap Act charge against service provider despite absence of SCA
liability).
82. United States v. Long, 64 M.J. 57, 63 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (consent to monitoring did
not imply consent to "engage in law enforcement intrusions by examining the contents of
particular e-mails in a manner unrelated to maintenance of the e-mail system."). Whether a
user forfeits an expectation of privacy when he violates those terms of service is not at issue
in this case. See United States v. Young, 350 F.3d 1302, 1308 (11th Cir. 2004) (expectation
of privacy in package unreasonable when user shipped large amounts of cash in violation
of clear carrier contract after acknowledging carrier's unqualified right to inspect).
[Vol. 41
WARSHAK v. UNITED STATES
Notwithstanding its terms of service, a service provider's right to
protect its own property does not release the Government from the
constraints of the Constitution. Any third party that holds property on
behalf of another, such as a storage company, may retain the right to
inspect units to prevent damage that might occur to its property or
that of other customers. The fact that the storage company has or
exercises such a right, however, says nothing about the relationship
between the storage customer and government agents. A storage com-
pany may, on its own initiative and independently of government ac-
tion, provide to the Government the fruits of its own inspection. But
that does not give government agents license to conduct their own
warrantless search of a storage unit or to demand that the storage
company search it on the Government's behalf. When the Govern-
ment or its agent examines the contents of the storage locker, it in-
vades a reasonable expectation of privacy, even though the storage
company retained some right of access to protect its property.
In short, Warshak retained an expectation of privacy in his e-
mails stored on his service providers' systems, notwithstanding their
involvement in the search, their contract with him, or their business
practices. As a result, the Government needed to obtain at least a
probable-cause warrant before conducting the stored e-mail surveil-
lance in this case.
II. Government Agents Cannot Evade the Fourth
Amendment's Warrant Requirement by Compelling
Production of Communications from Third-Party
Service Providers
For access to communications subject to a reasonable expectation
of privacy, such as stored e-mails, the Fourth Amendment requires
that government agents obtain (at a minimum) a warrant based on
probable cause. Nevertheless, the Government argues that its agents
need only satisfy a "reasonableness" standard when they "compel pro-
duction" of materials. 83 To be clear, the Government does not argue
merely that a reasonableness standard applies when the target lacks a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the items the agents seek. Rather, the
Government argues that the reasonableness standard applies even
when the target has a reasonable expectation of privacy.84 This argument
83. Government Brief, supra note 12, at 36.
84. See id. at 38 (arguing that "a target's reasonable expectation of privacy affects only
his standing to challenge the reasonableness of compelled disclosure").
Spring 2007]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
cannot withstand scrutiny. Government agents simply cannot write the
warrant requirement out of the Fourth Amendment by compelling
production of evidence whenever they wish, without regard for the
underlying constitutionally-protected privacy interests.
The Government's ei ror stems from an over-reading of cases ap-
plying a "reasonableness" standard where government agents have
used a subpoena to compel production of documents or other items.
Properly understood, those cases identify two overlapping circum-
stances in which a reasonableness standard may be appropriate: (1)
where the target of an investigation has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the items the agents seek; and (2) when an agency uses a
statutorily authorized administrative subpoena in aid of its regulatory
mission, and pre-enforcement judicial process is available to evaluate
the intrusiveness of its demands. Neither circumstance is present
here.
A. Use of a "Reasonableness" Test to Evaluate Compelled
Production of Evidence Ordinarily Presumes or Follows
a Determination that the Target of the Investigation
Lacks a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
in the Items Agents Seek
In arguing that there is a well established body of law applying a
"reasonableness" standard to evaluate compelled production of mater-
ials,85 the Government ignores a key unifying theme of this case law:
that the use of a reasonable subpoena to compel production of mater-
ials is permissible where the target of the investigation lacks any expecta-
tion of privacy in those materials.
In its effort to draw a categorical distinction between searching
for evidence and compelling its production, the Government relies on
language in United States v. Dionisio,8 6 a case involving whether a sub-
poena compelling individuals to appear before a grand jury and to
give voice exemplars violated the Fourth Amendment.8 7 Dionisio in
fact undermines the Government's position, for it illustrates that use
of a subpoena does not eliminate the need to inquire into a target's
expectation of privacy. The Court bifurcated its analysis of the respon-
dents' Fourth Amendment challenge, first concluding that the order
that the individuals appear before the grand jury did not constitute an
85. Government Brief, supra note 12, at 38-39.
86. 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
87. Id. at 3; see Government Brief, supra note 12, at 39.
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unlawful seizure,8 8 and then examining whether, once the individuals
were lawfully before the grand jury, the further direction to make voice
recordings constituted an unlawful search.89 The language on which
the Government relies addressed only the first question, concerning
the distinction between an arrest and a subpoena compelling one's
appearance. On the second question, the Court concluded that no
reasonable expectation of privacy existed, since the Fourth Amend-
ment does not protect physical characteristics, such as the sound of
one's voice, that an individual knowingly and necessarily exposes to
the public.90 What matters here is the Court's mode of analysis: the
Court did not suggest that the mere use of a subpoena eliminates any
need to inquire into any expectation of privacy. Rather, it recognized
that compelled production of evidence can be sufficiently intrusive
and immediate to constitute a search. Its assessment of whether the
respondents had a reasonable expectation of privacy in voice charac-
teristics would have been unnecessary if the Government's theory in
this case were correct.
The "business records" cases on which the Government relies-in
which courts applied a reasonableness standard in evaluating the use
of subpoenas to compel production of corporate books and docu-
ments-carry similar import.91 Many of those cases predated the
Court's decision in Katz v. United States,92 and thus have no bearing on
whether use of a subpoena categorically defeats a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy. In rejecting Fourth Amendment claims in such cases,
the Court consistently underscored the fact that the records involved
were merely corporate records.93
The Court's decision in Katz spurred new challenges to agents'
acquisition of corporate records, on the theory that the owner or sub-
ject of the records had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the doc-
uments. The Supreme Court first squarely addressed such a claim in
88. Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 9-10.
89. Id. at 13-15.
90. Id. at 14.
91. See Government Brief, supra note 12, at 36-40, 43-45.
92. See Government Brief, supra note 12, at 36 (referring to "[a] century of Supreme
Court case law"); id. at 38-89 (citing Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911); Okla.
Press Publ'g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946)).
93. See Walling, 327 U.S. at 208 (distilling prior case law as follows: "[in so far as
[earlier cases] apply merely to the production of corporate records and papers in response
to a subpoena or order authorized by law and safeguarded by judicial sanction," those
cases establish that the Fourth Amendment "guards against abuse only by way of too much
indefiniteness or breadth ... if also the inquiry is one the demanding agency is authorized
by law to make and the materials specified are relevant.").
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United States v. Miller,94 discussed above.95 The Court concluded that
the target of the investigation lacked any expectation of privacy in the
documents and upheld the compelled disclosure, the reasonableness
of which was uncontested by the banks to whom the subpoenas were
issued.96 Importantly, the Court never suggested that an inquiry into
Miller's reasonable expectation of privacy was unnecessary because
government agents proceeded by subpoena; it said that no expecta-
tion of privacy existed. Although Miller establishes the post-Katz vitality
of a "reasonableness" analysis in cases involving compelled disclosure
of business records, it is important to understand why a reasonable-
ness analysis applies in Miller and subsequent cases. It is not because a
target's expectation of privacy can always be overcome by a mere sub-
poena. Rather, it is because the targeted materials in cases such as
Miller involve no expectation of privacy. Indeed, as the Court has ob-
served, "[s] pecial problems of privacy" may be presented by attempts
to compel production of items that are not business records, such as a
personal diary. 97
The subpoena cases on which the Government relies to suggest
that use of a subpoena categorically eliminates the need to inquire
into the target's expectation of privacy are additional cases in the
Miller line.98
The Government cites only a single post-Katz case in which a
court sustained the use of a subpoena to compel production of prop-
erty despite the court's explicit assumption that the target of the inves-
tigation maintained an expectation of privacy in the property sought.
In United States v. Palmer,99 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that the Government did not violate the Fourth Amendment
when it compelled a defendant's attorney to produce property held
on the defendant's behalf. The court reasoned that "a properly lim-
ited subpoena does not constitute an unreasonable search and seizure
under the fourth amendment." 100
94. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
95. See supra notes 64-73 and accompanying text.
96. See Miller, 425 U.S. at 446 n.9.
97. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 401 n.7 (1976).
98. See, e.g., Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc., 464 U.S. 408, 415 (1984) (seeking payroll
and sales records, which the Court characterized as "corporate books or records"); S.E.C. v.
Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 743 (1984) (seeking financial records).
99. 536 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1976).
100. Id. at 1282.
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In reaching this conclusion, Palmer relied on business cases pre-
dating Miller, including Walling, Hale v. Henkel,10 and others. Palmer
was decided within six weeks of Miller and did not cite that decision.
Because Palmer relied exclusively on cases that the Miller Court clari-
fied involved no reasonable expectation of privacy, it is not persuasive
authority for the proposition that a subpoena is appropriate even
where a reasonable expectation of privacy exists.
B. Administrative Subpoena Cases Are Wholly Inapplicable in This
Case
The Government also relies on administrative subpoena cases to
support a categorical distinction between compelling production of
evidence and searching for evidence.' 0 2 The rationale for evaluating
an administrative subpoena under a reasonableness inquiry does not
apply in this case.
Case law concerning administrative subpoenas recognizes that,
when a corporation's activities affect interstate commerce, the federal
Government has an investigative power analogous to the "visitorial"
power of the incorporating state. 10 Accordingly, Congress may grant
an agency a "power of inquisition" into whether the law that the
agency administers is being violated, t0 4 and courts will test the use of
such a subpoena under a reasonableness analysis. 10 5
Although the Government contends that the § 2703(d) orders at
issue in this case are analogous to administrative subpoenas, 10 6 they
are not. Even those statutes authorizing the Attorney General to issue
administrative subpoenas as a prelude to a criminal investigation spec-
ify the narrow regulatory function the subpoena authority must
serve.10 7 In contrast, § 2703 is a general rule of criminal procedure,
101. 201 U.S. 43, 70 (1906).
102. See Government Brief, supra note 12, at 40-41 (citing In re Admin. SubpoenaJohn
Doe, D.P.M., 253 F.3d 256 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632
(1950)); id. at 39 (citing In re Subpoena Duces Tecum (United States v. Bailey), 228 F.3d
341 (4th Cir. 2000)).
103. See Okla. Press Publ'g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 204 (1946).
104. See Morton Salt, 338 U.S. at 642, 652 (noting that "the privilege of engaging in
interstate commerce" carries with it "an enhanced measure of regulation").
105. See Doe, 253 F.3d at 265.
106. See Government Brief, supra note 12, at 41 n.7 (characterizing § 2703(d) orders as
"a form of agency investigative authority" analogous to that recognized in Morton Salt).
107. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 876 (2000) (authorizing use of administrative subpoenas in
investigations "relating to the [Attorney General's] functions under this subchapter with
respect to controlled substances, listed chemicals, tableting machines, or encapsulating
machines"); 18 U.S.C. § 1968 (2000) (authorizing a "civil investigative demand" for "docu-
mentary materials relevant to a racketeering investigation"); 18 U.S.C. § 3486(a)(1)(A)(i)
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analogous to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and
untethered to any specific regulatory function. Cases concerning ad-
ministrative subpoenas are thus wholly inapplicable in this case.
Even if administrative subpoena cases were relevant here, those
cases do not support the Government's position that an inquiry into a
reasonable expectation of privacy is irrelevant whenever government
agents choose to compel production of, rather than search for, evi-
dence. Administrative subpoena cases recognize not only that such
subpoenas must serve a narrow regulatory mission, but also that the
legitimacy of an administrative subpoena derives from the judicial
process available to test the intrusiveness of the subpoena before it is
enforced. Two of the administrative subpoena cases on which the Gov-
ernment relies-both dealing with administrative subpoenas in con-
nection with health care fraud investigations-illustrate this principle.
In In re Subpoena Duces Tecum (United States v. Bailey),10 8 the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit explained that a subpoena "com-
mences an adversary process during which the person served with the
subpoena may challenge it in court before complying with its de-
mands .... As judicial process is afforded before any intrusion occurs, the
proposed intrusion is regulated by, and its justification derives from, that pro-
cess."109 Similarly, in In re Administrative Subpoena John Doe, D.P.M.,110
this Court recognized that the target of the administrative subpoena
had an opportunity to challenge the intrusiveness of that subpoena
before complying with it.11' In both of these cases, the target of the
subpoena was also the target of the investigation, and thus could as-
sert any relevant privacy interests in the documents requested before a
court enforced the subpoena.
An order to compel production of e-mail is distinct from the ad-
ministrative subpoenas used in Bailey and Doe in two obvious respects.
First, because the service provider on whom a § 2703(d) order is
served is not the target of the investigation, and only the recipient of
the order has an opportunity to challenge it, the target of the investi-
gation has no opportunity parallel to that of Bailey or Doe to assert
that the order is unduly intrusive. To be sure, as the Government
notes, the Supreme Court has applied a reasonableness test to evalu-
(2000) (authorizing administrative subpoenas in connection with investigation of health
care offenses or sexual exploitation or abuse of children).
108. 228 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2000).
109. Id. at 348 (emphasis added).
110. 253 F.3d 256 (6th Cir. 2001).
111. Id. at 264.
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ate subpoenas even when agents compel disclosure of information
held by parties who are not themselves the subject of an investiga-
tion.1 12 As discussed above, however, the evaluation of a third-party
subpoena under a reasonableness standard either presumes or follows
a prior determination that the target of the investigation lacks an ex-
pectation of privacy in the items compelled. 113
Second, in both Bailey and Doe, the documents the agents sought
were records compiled in the ordinary course of a business relation-
ship-records in which (as explained above) the Supreme Court has
found any expectation of privacy to be unreasonable. 1 4
In sum, contrary to the Government's argument, the compelled
production of evidence through use of a subpoena is not analytically
distinct from a search for evidence. Both approaches require inquiry
into a target's reasonable expectation of privacy. To hold otherwise
would be to suggest that government agents can evade the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment whenever it is convenient for
them to do so, by "compelling production" of, rather than searching
for, the evidence they seek.
Conclusion
In sum, stored e-mail surveillance by the Government on less
than probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment. Compelling a
service provider to produce a person's e-mail does not entitle govern-
ment agents to evade constitutional prerequisites. A holding to the
contrary would eviscerate the privacy of modem communications.
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